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Abstract 
Numerous attempts in the social science literature tried to capture the political essence and features of Hungary’s 
‘illiberal’ regime but few aimed to analyse specific public policy fields in the illiberal democracy. This paper 
analyses the cultural policy of the Orbán regime as a case study. The focus is on ideology that legitimises power 
structures in the political system (Vestheim 2012a). With the help of a qualitative case study based on document 
analysis, I am looking for the popular ideology of postcommunist traditionalism legitimising managed illiberal 
democracy (Csillag & Szelényi). I analyse governmental policy making in culture on two interrelated levels: (1) 
attempts to rewrite the cultural canon (2) institutional and financial changes. . The results of my case study show 
that postcommunist traditionalism serves as a discursive framework for elite replacement and the redistribution 
of cultural positions and resources, contributing to the creation of a new, loyal elite for the managed illiberal 
political system.   
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1. Introduction: illiberal democracy in Hungary? 
Fared Zakaria in his famous article noticed already in the 1990s that, in contrast with Francis Fukuyama’s 
popular democratic teleology, countries that recently had gone under the process of democratization, did not 
turned into western type liberal democracies. Although these countries institutionalized free and fair elections, 
they do not fulfil the criteria of rule of law, power sharing and the respect of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. In consequence, the concepts of democracy and constitutional liberalism became more and more 
separated (Zakaria, 1997). However, at that time the label of illiberal democracy was reserved for countries like 
Argentina or Kazakhstan. Post-communist East-European countries were considered as ‘good students’ of 
democratization, and the most distinguished ones, like Hungary or Poland, were even foreshadowed to reach the 
honoured state of consolidated democracy (Higley and Lengyel, 2000) 
After the millennium and the inclusive EU-enlargement in 2004 when 10 Eastern-European countries gained 
access to the European Union, less optimistic judgements were raised in and about the region, assuming a certain 
‘backsliding’ and the ‘death of the liberal consensus’ (Krastev, 2007). At that time, the credit of being the 
‘illiberal capital of the region’ was attributed to Poland under the first government of the Kaczyński brothers. 
However, after the fall of the Hungarian social democrat–liberal coalition and the victory of Viktor Orbán’s 
Fidesz by a two-third majority in 2010, this dubious glory went to Hungary. Since then, a renewed interest in 
political science has turned towards Hungary and a growing body of literature analyses the essence and features 
of the ‘new Hungarian regime’.  
The Orbán regime has been labelled inter alia populist democracy (Pappas, 2014), broken democracy (Bozóki, 
2015), elected autocracy (Ágh, 2015) and mafia state (Magyar, 2013). Recently, Bozóki and Hegedűs have 
provided a comprehensive review of Hungarian literature and the state of debate about the Orbán regime (Bozóki 
and Hegedüs, 2017). They state that by now it is most commonly categorized as a hybrid regime, although some 
of the most influential authors do not share this view.  
One of the sharpest critiques came from János Kornai, who sees Hungary’s latest political changes as a U-turn: a 
systematic destruction of democracy. In his analysis, he describes the processes of centralization and 
nationalization as ‘thousands of discrete changes moving to the same direction: to autocracy’ (Kornai, 2015). In 
the meantime, he admits that in spite of governmental attempts to limit cultural pluralism, intellectual life is 
thriving in Hungary.  
Steady critics target the weakening of the rule of law (Bugaric, 2016) with retroactive legislation and occasional 
amendments of the constitution. The legitimacy of the new Fundamental Law initiated in 2011 is also 
controversial (Arató, 2012; Jakab and Körösényi, 2012; Majtényi and Szabó, 2011; Tóth, 2012). According to 
the analysis of András Körösényi, the most important characteristics of the Orbán-regime are the strong, 
unipersonal centralization of power, the strong claim for legitimation, anti-pluralist and populist political visions 
and the claim for an ideological hegemony. The result of these features are new and autocratic elements in 
governance, even if the regime itself is not an autocracy because it still passes the polyarchy test proposed by 
Dahl (Körösényi, 2015).The autocratic tendencies in Hungary are often compared to Putin’s regime in Russia. 
The most elaborated argumentation of the Putin-Orbán parallel is Ivan Szelényi’s managed illiberal democratic 
capitalism concept  (Szelenyi, 2015; Csillag and Szelenyi, 2015). Szelényi argues that in spite of the illiberal 
tendencies, these two regimes are still democracies given that their government has a mandate gained in 
elections. Though the free and fair nature of the elections is questionable, especially in Russia, still, elected 
leaders are widely popular. 
János Kis, on the contrary, argues that illiberal democracy is not a democracy anymore because it is legitimated 
only by the political majority while the minority is marginalised (Kis, 2014). Somewhat similarly, Halmai argues 
that the regime is hybrid because even its institutional structure is not democratic (Halmai, 2014). Bozóki calls it 
‘liberal autocracy’; an autocracy that respects some of the human rights (Bozóki, 2016). Bozóki and Hegedűs 
finally conclude that since 2014 at the latest the Orbán regime is not a democracy but a centralised, personalised, 
illiberal, and anti-democratic hybrid regime (Bozóki and Hegedüs, 2017). 
There is no concordance in the political science literature whether the Orbán regime has a clear ideological 
orientation in the sense of a coherent vision of the good society (Downs 1957). . Szikra in her recent paper 
grouped scholarly standpoints into three categories (Szikra, 2017). According to the first line of argument, 
political actions of the Orbán administration have no particular ideological orientation, but are driven by the pure 
interest of the ruling elite. this is the concept of  “the mafia state” (Magyar, 2013). According to the second 
approach, ideology is important but far from being coherent. Rather, a ‘bricolage’ method could be observed 
(Körösényi, 2015; Szikra, 2014) The third approach claims for an ideology driven policy-making (Mike, 2014; 
Csillag and Szelenyi, 2015).  
According to the concept of Csillag and Szelényi, the popular ideology of postcommunist 
traditionalism/neoconservatism is used for legitimizing the system of managed illiberal democratic capitalism. 
Post-communist traditionalism has its conservative elements such as ‘patria, church and the (traditional) family’. 
However, this East European type of traditionalism could not be counted as a classic conservative ideology for it 
embraces etatism and does not fully respect individual freedom rights.1 The main characteristics of this ideology 
are the following: (1) socially conservative, (2) populist in the sense that it inspires social movements (culture 
wars) around socially conservative issues (like anti-LMBT), (3) differentiating between the ‘deserving’ and 
‘undeserving’ poor, (4) anti-immigration and generally opposing affirmative action, and (5) patriotic and 
religious (Csillag and Szelenyi and, 2015). While the authors elaborate their concept mostly on Putin’s Russia, 
and Orbán’s Hungary,  they note that actually the whole postcommunist CEE region has proven to be receptive 
to this ideology: they mention inter alia Mečiar, Fico, Băsescu, Babiš, Lukashenko and Yanukovych. At the time 
of writing the article, in 2017, Poland under the second Kaczyński government is the most striking case of 
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    Interestingly, while post-communist traditionalism is strongly anti-communist in its rhetoric,  it 
sometimes refers to social phenomena that were typical of the Kádár era under the label of „traditional” 
(Dupcsik, 2012). 
postcommunist traditionalism; becoming infamous of its planned and failed abortion ban (Bielinska-
Kowalewska, 2017; Korolczuk, 2017).2 
1. Cultural policy in the Orbán regime: context and criticism  
The aim of my paper is to analyse the cultural policy of the Orbán regime with the help of the concept of 
postcommunist traditionalism. In my analysis, I focus on cultural policy understood as the efforts of the 
government to subsidize and control the artsSince 2010, the ruling political elite reallocated property rights, 
public and EU funds to new loyal economic elites who are much more closely controlled by the political elite 
(Csillag and Szelényi, 2015). In the field of culture, a similar process could be observed: the incumbent political 
elite aspires to the redistribution of cultural positions and resources.  
According to its definition in public policy analysis, cultural policy emerges when agents of the political system 
intervene with the production, distribution and consumption of cultural products, services and experiences. 
Cultural policy then expresses a relationship between a political system and the cultural field (Vestheim, 2012a). 
In other words, cultural policy is an overlapping zone between the field of culture and the field of politics 
(Vestheim, 2012b), which is structurally conflict-ridden because of the different logic and interests of the two 
fields. In the cultural policy making process, agents of the two fields negotiate about the level and form of public 
support that different areas of the cultural field should get. A variety of cultural policy models were first 
described by Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989).3 In their typology, 
Hungary (like most EU countries) fits into the architect model in which the intervening state actively supports 
cultural production.  
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communist traditionalism is indeed present in public policy-making, especially in the case of family policy, 
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   Their typology included (1) the facilitator, i.e. a restricted state that leaves culture to the market and 
private charity (e.g.. the USA); (2) the patron state that plays the role of a rich Seigneur, supporting culture and 
the arts for their own sake (Great Britain); (3) the architect, i.e. the intervening state which, with policy 
programmes, infrastructures and financial means actively supports cultural production, distribution and 
reception; and (4) the engineer type of state that is associated with non-democratic political systems. Many 
European states today represent a mixture of the facilitator and the architect models (Vestheim, 2012a). East 
European countries during the transition period shifted from the engineer to the architect, or in the case of ex-
Soviet countries, to the facilitator type (Rindzevičiūtė, 2012). 
 Discussing the relationship between cultural policy and the political system, Gray emphasises the impact of 
different forms of democratic arrangements on cultural policy (Gray, 2012). Direct, representative and 
deliberative democracies are each associated with different types of cultural policies. According to this 
terminology, the Hungarian case could be classified into the democratic elitism paradigm (Schumpeter, 1976). In 
this model, access and mass cultural participation is hardly emphasized. On the contrary, by providing forms of 
institutional autonomy for key actors, competing elite groups establish a situation where particular forms of 
expertise are seen as being the basis for making policy choices, and the lack of this expertise disqualifies the 
masses (Gray, 2012:512). This type of cultural policy model operates through arm’s-length governmental 
organisations or quangos and through forms of governance arrangements.  
 
The Hungarian language does not distinguish between policy and politics. The expression of ‘kultúrpolitika’ 
(cultural policy or politics) was associated with the ideological and political control and censorship of state 
socialism. Consequently, after the democratic transition, the term acquired negative connotations and the 
autonomy of culture was emphasized by all cultural and political actors (T. Kiss, 2015). However, it was also 
obvious that the financial support of the state remained indispensable (Marsovszky, 2003; T. Kiss, 2015). The 
solution included the foundation of formally autonomous arm’s length organizations, such as the National 
Cultural Fund. Nevertheless, each and every government has been accused by their political rivals with 
favouring their ideologically friendly cultural actors.  
As for the context of the cultural policy of the Orbán regime, it is important to note that Hungarian society is 
deeply polarized politically and ideologically . Left and right self-identification is especially strong compared to 
the European average (Körösényi, 2013). In the cultural elite, polarization is even stronger, as educated groups in 
general and intellectuals especially are more involved in political participation and public debates than other 
social groups (Kristóf, 2011). ‘Culture wars’ (Kulturkampf) have been prevalent phenomena after the collapse of 
the Kádár regime in 1989. In contrast to the political elite, the cultural elite was not affected significantly by the 
regime change; most of its members ‘survived’ the transformation period (Kristóf, 2012; Szelényi et al., 1995). 
Consequently, two parallel narratives used to dominate Hungarian intellectual life (Kristóf 2017): according to 
the left-liberal view, the recruitment of the late communist period’s cultural elite was primarily meritocratic, and 
cultural canons settled in the transition period are culturally legitimate. According to right-wing intellectuals, 
leftist hegemony or dominance in culture is the product of 40 years of discretional adverse selection, and even 
after the regime change conservative and nationalistic views remained unfairly repressed by the post-communist 
elite. Attempts to balance this perceived unfairness included media-wars and the foundations of alternative 
cultural awards.4    
The electoral failure of his first administration in 2002 was attributed by Viktor Orbán to the strength of the 
surviving post-communist elite. In the next decade, he was continuously working on the strengthening of the 
economic and cultural embeddedness of his party.  In every year, Orbán gathered his loyal intellectual and 
economic elite to an exclusive meeting in the countryside, in the village of Kötcse. Beyond networking and 
teambuilding, the highlight of these meetings has always been a speech by Viktor Orbán. In 2009 – already sure 
to win the next elections – he explained to the people who are going to be in important political positions in the 
coming years his thoughts on ‘culture’s future role’. In the absence of official, written cultural policy 
programme, this speech used to be the base for the analysis of Orbán’s principles on cultural policy. Here, he 
designated the function of cultural policy as creating and maintaining the political community. Thus, culture is 
not a distinct sphere, separated from politics. According to the future prime minister, the evaluation of the 
cultural elite (especially in Eastern Europe) is always based on its political rather than cultural achievement 
because cultural achievement is always a matter of debate and there is no universal standard to measure it. In the 
meantime, these debates on values should stay within the narrow circle of the elite and not go public. In the 
public sphere, politics should be defined by a central field of force not divided by value debates but ‘naturally’ 
representing national values.5 As it happened, Fidesz won the next elections by a two-third majority and got a 
second chance to realize its public policy vision.  
Already the first Orbán-government between 1998 and 2002 was heavily attacked for threatening the autonomy 
of the cultural field (Marsovszky, 2003). After 2010, the government’s cultural policy was interpreted by its 
critics as an attempt for political homogenisation and radical elite change (Bajomi-Lázár et al., 2013). Arguably, 
this political program regards the notion of culture as exclusive, normative and having an ideological function. In 
an influential collection of critical essays (Magyar, 2013), using the post-communist mafia state concept, Bozóki 
summarised the main characteristics of the cultural policy of the Orbán regime in six points: 1. concentration of 
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created for right-wing artists who were not appreciated by social-democratic governments.  
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   http://www.fidesz.hu/hirek/2010-02-17/meg337rizni-a-letezes-magyar-min337seget/ 
power and centralization, 2. limitation of self-government, 3. state capture; 4. task delegation to the political 
clientele, 5. aspiration for the homogenisation of culture, and 6. relying on the method of ‘punish and 
discipline’(Bozóki, 2013). A more friendly analysis (Pápay, 2014) contradicts the aspiration of elite change and 
argues that the cultural policy of the second Orbán government lacks a strong conception. Pápay emphasises the 
plurality of power centres in the government, and the heterogeneity of cultural policy making as a consequence 
of responsive politics. In this frame, the most criticized actions are only symbolic gestures for conservative 
voters (Pápay, 2014). In a case study on theatre, I empirically demonstrated the process and consequences of 
elite change at least in one cultural field (Kristóf, 2017). 
2. Analysis 
Analysing cultural policy, Vestheim points to four dimensions that are important to consider: (1) aims, norms and 
ideologies; (2) institutional structures, agents and interests; (3) access and participation; and (4) distribution of 
economic resources. Beyond explicit cultural policies, he also emphasises the importance of ‘implicit’ cultural 
policies that represent a ‘hidden’ ideology that legitimises power structures outside and inside the political 
system (Vestheim, 2012a: 496). 
 
In my present analysis, I focus on the first point above, including ‘hidden’ ideology, but also examine its effect 
on the second and the fourth points. I analyse the cultural policy of the Orbán regime on two interrelated levels: 
(1) attempts to alter the cultural canon (i.e. the body of work that is considered to be most important for the 
national culture) and (2) institutional and financial changes. Focusing on the discursive elements of governance 
(Hall, 1993; Korkut et al., 2016), I try to detect whether there is an ideological drive behind the actions of the 
government that aim at changing existing cultural structures.  
In my analysis I follow an explorative qualitative case study research design (Yin, 2009). It is a single-case 
study; I examine the cultural policy of the Hungarian government and do not compare it explicitly with other 
country cases. However, the implicit cross-case analysis behind my study might be a comparison to the cultural 
policy of other EU member states that assumedly do not applies postcommunist traditionalism (Csillag – 
Szelényi, 2015). Methodologically saying, Hungary has been selected as a deviant case inside the European 
Union for my analysis. Within the category of single-case design, the type of my research is an embedded single-
case study, I study cultural policy through multiple units of analysis (Yin, 2009). The rationale of selecting the 
units of analysis was the following: I applied a mixed method research design. First I collected the publicly 
accessible documents on the explicit and implicit cultural policy of the two Orbán governments between 2010 
and 2016, focusing on art policy, and excluding broadly understood cultural fields such as cultural heritage or 
sports.6 The core texts of the analysis from the government’s side are the speech of Kötcse7 and the National 
Awowal. I also examined the regular cultural policy analyses of the government thinkł tank Századvég. I 
supplemented this document analysis with a secondary analysis of media interviews with the cultural political 
representatives of the government between 2010-2016.. As a second step, all the documents were collected and 
coded by the Maxquda content analysis software. The logic of coding was looking for the elements of 
postcommunist traditionalism 8 in the texts. Certainly, not all the elements listed by Csillag and Szelényi was 
relevant for cultural policy-making. Issues of immigration or the ‘undeserving poor” were hardly to cultural 
policy issues. But elements of social conservatism and culture wars against liberalism; anti-LGBT and anti-
semitism, patriotism and religiousness were frequently identified and coded. In the following section I analyse 
those actions of the government as analytic units, where, according to the result of the qualitative content 
analysis, postcommunist traditionalism, the ideology of illiberalism, provided a discursive framework for policy 
making.. These actions could be categorised into two groups: two of them (illustration for the Fundamental Law 
and the National Library series) affected the  the cultural canon while other three (power delegation to the 
Hungarian Academy of Arts, and director turnovers of the National Theatre and the New Theatre) were more 
concrete; altering institutional or even financial structures. After exploring the analytical units, in the discussion I 
try to bring together the traditionalist elements of the cultural policy of the Orbán-governments and answer my 
research question. 
3.1 Attempts for canon rewriting 
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paper. It has already been analysed in the frame of party colonization, (Bajomi-Lázár, 2013), while the 
systematic analysis of reallocated property rights is still missing. 
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   This document was dated from 2009; but later documents referred to it so frequently that it soon 
revealed as a core text so I included it in the analysis (logically it also belongs to the cultural policy after 2010 as 
it sets the trends). 
8 (1) social conservativism, (2) populism in the sense that it inspires social movements (culture wars) around 
socially conservative issues (like anti-LMBT), (3) differentiating between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ 
poor, (4) anti-immigration and generally opposing affirmative action, and (5) patriotism and religiousness 
(Csillag and Szelenyi and, 2015). 
One of the widely recognized characteristics of Orbán’s government is the strong claim for ideological 
legitimation. The new Hungarian constitution of 2011 begins with a so-called National Avowal9 that contains 
many allusions to Christianity and national pride. For the popularization of the new Fundamental Law, a well-
known Orbán-supporting intellectual and stage director Imre Kerényi was appointed as ‘deputy of the prime 
minister responsible for laying the foundations of reflective national constitutional thinking and for performing 
the duties linked to the preservation and development of cultural values.’ This long and entangled title has been a 
good target for irony in the Hungarian media, though, after a while, Kerényi has been commonly referred simply 
as the ‘deputy of symbolic issues’. With his appointment, a new position was created in cultural policy; the 
deputy of the prime minister was an outsider in the formal ministerial structure, his bureaucratic ranking is 
similar to a state secretary, but he is responsible only to the prime minister. 
Kerényi’s first activity was to erect the ‘Tables of the Fundamental Law’ in public offices. These were solemn 
places where the ceremonial copies of the new Fundamental Law were placed so that anyone could freely study 
them.10 His second idea – more specifically linked to cultural policy – was to commission paintings from 
contemporary artists on the most important events of Hungarian history from the last 150 years.11 The paintings 
were ordered as illustrations to the new Fundamental Law and were presented in a road-show across the country. 
The large figurative pictures covered among others World War I, the Holocaust, the Hungarian Revolution in 
1956, and also some more recent political events like the police attack on peaceful protesters in 2006. The last 
piece of the painting series was titled „New Constitution is Born.12 The first reaction of art historians was to 
criticize the anachronism of commissioning historical paintings in the 21th century. Secondly, the aesthetic value 
of some of the paintings were contested. Another cause of criticism was that the price paid by the government 





   For a year, then the project was declared to be very successful and the ministerial order was repealed. 
11 
    The memory politics of the Orbán government is beyond the scope of this paper, here I am confined 
only to its visual representation in the painting series. One very controversial example is the monument erected 




   Digital gallery of the paintings: http://hvg.hu/itthon/20111107_kerenyi_imre_festmenyek 
was much above market price. Beyond these critics, the selections of historical events were queried; especially if 
the police attack in 2006 can be paralleled to the counter-Soviet Revolution of 1956. In the case of this painting, 
questionable subject and questionable esthetic value were brought together. As a reaction to critics, Kerényi 
admitted that the goal of this project was to challenge the existing canon, and he attributed the attacks to this 
challenge:  
Here we can find a logically constructed, powerful system, where chain link after chain link is realized, 
certainly you don’t like it, because this is not the left-liberal canon.13 
The canon-rewriting programme of the government was not restricted to the sphere of visual arts. The next 
project – initiated by Viktor Orbán and implemented by the deputy of symbolic issues – was the book series 
called National Library. The project implied a new edition of Hungarian classics published by the government. 
The criteria of the selection were again the rewriting of the existing cultural canon. As Kerényi put it even more 
explicitly: 
The canon of the national right should be strengthened, against the left-liberal canon that had hegemony 
for over 61 years. That is why the help of the state is needed here. Every considerable political regime 
tried to represent itself in buildings, founding newspapers and television channels. Political regimes 
have a demand to represent. This could not be left to a private publishing house.14  
First, the Organization of Publishers criticized the project for its intervention into the publishing market. More 
serious critics targeted copyright issues.15 in some cases, literary property was unsettled, so several volumes of 
the National Library proved to be pirate editions. Kerényi attributed these problems to the hurriedness of the 
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    In some cases, literary property was unsettled, so several volumes of the National Library proved to 
be pirate editions. Kerényi attributed these problems to the hurriedness of the project and promised to settle 
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project and promised to settle copyright. In one case, he was unsuccessful, which resulted in the dropping of an 
important author from the series.  
By now, 48 volumes of the National Library series have been published and about the same number are planned. 
Most of the books are unquestionable Hungarian classics. However, unlike in the case of the painting series, 
where the piece on Holocaust was painted by the reputed painter László Gyémánt, whose realization was 
completely mainstream and up to international Holocaust memory standards, the opening volume of the National 
Library was the controversially evaluated writer, Cecile Tormay’s saga, The Old House (written in 1914). 
Kerényi declared this choice as a symbolic act; the rehabilitation of the writer. Tormay was a popular and reputed 
writer of her time (even nominated for the Nobel prize in the 1930s), but after WW II she was deleted from the 
literary canon because of her strong rightist orientation, irredentism and open antisemitism. After the collapse of 
communism, she was still not presentable- While other artists who were prohibited in the communist period as 
authors of ‘bourgeois literature’, like Sándor Márai, were re-added to the canon, Tormay, though republished, 
remained sub-cultural. It was only after the millennium, that she was rediscovered and – despite  her known 
lesbian orientation – became an icon for the right-wing political community.16 Nevertheless, The Old House is 
another book of hers, not the most famous and infamously anti-Semitic An Outlaw’s Diary. Imre Kerényi 
assured the press that he was not planning to publish the Diary in the National Library series. 
The canon-rewriting activities of the government were clearly intended to provoke culture wars. Besides the 
cultural legitimization of the government’s political aims, the goal was also to challenge the existing 
interpretations of historical and literature canon. The cult of radically nationalist authors (many of them writing 
extensively on the Trianon trauma) contributes to the patriotic-nationalist character of post-communist 
traditionalism.  
However, anti-Semite cheracter of the same authors is rather unconfortable for the cultural government. Anti-
semitism is an element of the contra-minorities agenda that is most relevant in the Hungarian cultural discourse 
but least tolerated in the Hungarian public sphere (anti-immigrant and anti-Roma views are more mainstream). 
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   Besides Tormay, other two ’national radical’ authors, Albert Wass and József Nyírő played similar 
roles in the struggles around the literature canon: their inclusion in the school curriculum provoked intensive 
debates (see for example http://www.hetek.hu/belfold/201206/irodalmi_kanon_leporoljak). One author of this 
radical nationalist ’triad’, Albert Wass has been widely popular among readers already since the 1990s on his 
own right, without government efforts. 
Accordingly, open antisemitism is not accepted by the government. Viktor Orbán himself several times declared 
zero tolerance against it. Imre Kertész, writer of the Nobel prize winning Holocaust memoir Fatelessness, was 
awarded with the highest Hungarian state order (Szent István rend) by the Orbán government.17 Film director 
László Nemes Jeles was also immediately awarded by the government after his film Son of Saul had won the 
Academy Award in the category of Best Foreign Language Film in 2016. 
3.2 Institutional and funding changes 
Political patronage in Hungary is rather extensive, not only in bureaucracy (Meyer-Sahling, 2008) but also in the 
economic and cultural sphere (Kristóf, 2015). After every change of government, many positions in culture are 
redistributed, not so much out of ideological motivation as in the interests of the political clientele (Kristóf, 
2017). However, in the case of the Orbán governments ideologically supported political patronage attempted to 
restructure the whole system. In this section, I present three actions of the government shaping cultural 
institutions.. The first one, power delegation to the Hungarian Academy of Arts affected even the Hungarian 
constitution, and restructured significantly the system of state support for the arts. The second action concerns 
the single position of the director of the National Theatre, which is of outstanding symbolical importance. The 
third action (New Theatre) shows how political patronage trickles down to the local level and allows a mayor to 
interfere into the artistic repertoire of a theatre. 
Article X of the new Fundamental Law, after declaring that ‘Hungary shall ensure the freedom of scientific 
research and artistic creation’, as a new element, it designates two institutions: ’Hungary shall protect the 
scientific and artistic freedom of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Hungarian Academy of Arts.’18  
Although this is a fairly liberal principle, it still aroused wide criticism. The object of criticism was the 
Hungarian Academy of Arts. Why has the judgement of a social organization, founded ’to facilitate the 
prevalence and protection of the values of Hungarian and universal culture, the respect of the traditions of 
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Hungarian arts and the birth of new and significant artistic works’19  been so controversial? To understand this, 
one has to be familiar with the history of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The Academy of Sciences 
(founded in 1825) is the oldest and grandest cultural institution in Hungary. Originally, it had an Aesthetics 
Subsection, but it was terminated by the Communist Party in 1949. After the fall of communism, reflecting the 
deep political-ideological division of the Hungarian cultural sphere, two Academies of Arts were formed in 1992, 
curiously both claiming anteriority. The Széchenyi Academy of Letters and Arts (SZALA) was founded as an 
institution affiliated with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The Hungarian Academy of Arts (HAA) was 
created as an independent social organisation. SZALA did not officially identify with any worldview but was 
perceived as an association of liberal artists. By contrast, HAA proudly declared its ‘national commitment’ and 
conservative views. Double membership in the two organizations was never prohibited and still exists. However, 
HAA also expects national commitment and public activity from its members, beyond cultural achievement.  
The founding president of HAA, architect Imre Makovecz had a significant reputation as a right-wing public 
intellectual. When Viktor Orbán (a liberal politician between 1989 and 1994) made his conservative turn, 
Makovecz played an important role among right-wing intellectuals to make Orbán accepted as the political 
leader of the right. He died in 2011 but his Academy got into the new Hungarian constitution and the succeeding 
president of HAA, interior designer György Fekete (a member of the same generation as Makovecz but much 
less widely-known and reputed) became one of the most influential actors in cultural policy. 
Before 2011, the two Academies of Arts served only as reputational institutions: it was an honour to get into 
them but membership hardly meant more than symbolic resources.20 Moreover, their activities were not widely 
known by the public. However, constitutional recognition foreshadowed the increasing significance of HAA. 
Before long it turned out that the government would like to delegate state functions to this cultural organization, 
re-established as an autonomous public body. To these delegated functions, the government assigned generous 
financial resources (see Table 1)  and allocated a moderate but yearly increasing life-annuity for its academic 
members. 
Table 1 HERE 
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20 
    Unlike in the Academy of Sciences, where full membership of the Academy includes a high life-
annuity. 
 The first activity of the newly empowered HAA was the takeover of Műcsarnok (Kunsthalle), the largest 
institution in Budapest designed for the exhibition of contemporary art. In the context of this takeover, György 
Fekete, the president of the academy, exposed his views on art and culture to the media, provoking indignation 
on the political left and criticism also on the right. In a famous interview, Fekete declared that he did not believe 
in democracy and would not allow the exhibition of anti-clerical art pieces in state-run institutions: 
There must not be blasphemy in state-run institutions. (…) I don’t give a damn about this modern 
democracy, for it’s not modern and it’s not democracy. It’s not democracy, because it wants to put 
minority power over majority power. This is not democracy – it’s anti-democracy. And in this, fascism, 
communism, this kind of liberalism – which I call ’pseudo-liberalism’ I cannot take this into 
consideration.21  
The director of Műcsarnok – previously appointed by and loyal to the Orbán administration – resigned in 
response to the takeover by HAA. Left and right-wing artists together signed a manifesto to express solidarity 
with him, while Fekete, based on previous critics coming from the churches, labelled him as a liberal. 
The figure of György Fekete rapidly became a symbol of all the government’s allegedly anti-liberal and 
traditionalist cultural views. After his authoritative public statements on Christian and national values in culture, 
fears of attempts of cultural homogenization and even censorship were raised in the cultural sphere. However,  
Fekete is a more than 80-year-old man. His hardcore conservativism has not met with unanimous 
acknowledgement in right-wing intellectual circles, not even at HAA. Some of the most famous members 
(among other the internationally reputed opera singer Andrea Rost) protested by quitting the Academy. Still, 
Fekete completed his second term as president of the organization. At the time of writing this article he already 
declared his resignation (in the fall of 2017), and this successor, to be elected by the members of the Academy, is 
still not known. In the past five years, beyond valuable real estates in Budapest, HAA was given a say in the 
allocation of state funding via the National Cultural Fund and it established numerous scholarships, awards and a 
research institute. 
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    With English subtitles, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PErD2Bm5Des  date of the video: 
2012.12.04. 
 
The restructuring of the National Cultural Fund (NCF) concerned several fields of art. NCF was founded in 1993 
as an institution to facilitate the autonomy of culture. It is a state-run fund, financed by taxes on gambling. The 
distribution of financial resources is based on tenders, therefore it is very important who delegates the tender 
evaluators. Originally, half of the members of the reading committees were delegated by cultural organizations, 
and the other half by the Ministry of Culture. In 2015, the delegation system was changed: one third of the 
delegates are now appointed by the Hungarian Academy of Arts, and the other two thirds are shared equally 
between cultural organizations and the ministry. The government argues that this shift is an expansion of cultural 
autonomy, since the cultural sphere now delegates two thirds of the committee members. However, cultural 
organisations strongly disagree with this decision, as they were not involved in it, and they regard HAA as an 
agent of the government.22  
HAA also has influence over the distribution of state-awards. The honorary title of Artist of the Nation, the top 
state-funded artistic award in Hungary, is directly donated by the president of HAA.  This award is intended for 
artists above 65 years for their life-work and accompanied by a life-annuity equal to 23 times the minimal 
pension. Seventy artists are allowed to hold the title simultaneously. Before this award was firstly distributed in 
2013, guesses circulated in the media whether HAA would go on a ‘culture war’ and reward political loyalty 
rather than cultural achievement. However, the reception of the prize-list was rather positive. Though HAA 
rewarded a few of its own heroes and omitted some liberal icons like the writer Péter Nádas, the film director 
Károly Makk, president of the rival art academy (SZALA) was also prized among others. Generally, the majority 
of the awards were distributed according to cultural achievement to artists who had nothing to do with politics or 
public intellectual activity. 
Institutional changes were not restricted to delegating power to the Hungarian Academy of Arts.  Theatre is a 
genre that is historically important for political power because of its direct effect and community-type 
experience. Moreover, unlike literature or other forms of art theatre is controllable to a degree without censorship 
through state funds and appointment policy. Hungary has a basically state-funded company-theatre structure. All 
of the bigger Hungarian cities have their local theatres with a permanent local company and, of course, Budapest 
has several theatres. Theatres are owned by local municipalities, which have the right to appoint their directors 
(along with the Ministry of Human Resources). Given this structure, the appointment of directors has never been 
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    On the protest letter of cultural organisations, see: http://mno.hu/kulturpolitika/levelet-irtak-a-
muveszek-a-lex-fekete-ellen-1313365 
just a matter of professional standards. It depended on the party affiliation of  local government. Since Fidesz 
won municipal elections in 2006, most of the country town theatre directors have been displaced.  
Similarly to the two Academy of Arts, there are two Hungarian theatrical societies and theatres can be members 
of one or both. The two organizations have very similar names: the older one is the Hungarian Theatre Society, 
while the younger one – founded in 2008 as a ‘counter organisation’ – is named Hungarian Theatrum Society. 
The founding members of this new society distinguished themselves from the elite of their artistic field, who 
typically started their careers or even gained their elite positions in the communist period. They echoed in the 
cultural field Orbán’s political vision about a special national approach, the importance of traditions and 
community in contrast with individuality and liberalism. The society’s president Attila Vidnyánszky nicely 
summed up the ideas of post-communist traditionalism: 
Every theatre in which many ideas are present has a right to exist. But for a long time, certain issues 
were handled as taboos and despised, such as patriotism, faithfulness, self-sacrifice hand devotion to 
God.23 
Newcomer right-wing theatre directors were affiliated with this latter Hungarian Theatrum Society that rapidly 
acquired influence in the sphere. They have a say in distributing grants of the National Cultural Fund and have 
started to build up an educational centre to counter the monopoly of the liberal University of Theatre and Film 
Arts in Budapest. 
In the Hungarian cultural sphere, the two most reputed institutional position are the president of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, and the director of the National Theatre (Kristóf, 2014). While the former is elected by 
members of the Academy and is therefore no political appointee, the director of the National Theatre is appointed 
by the government and has always been a target of political debate as a symbolic position that represents the 
traditions and values of Hungarian culture. Since the end of the 1990s, this debate has been even more heated 
because of the design and location of the theatre building.24 Since 2008, the National Theatre was directed by 
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    The old building of the National Theatre was ruined by the communist government in the 1960s. After 
the regime change in 1989, every administration had its own concept on the design and the location of a new, 
representative building. The first Orbán-administration in 1998 stopped an ongoing construction initiated by the 
Róbert Alföldi, a reputed actor-director, who was heavily attacked in the Parliament by the far-right party Jobbik 
during his term because of his hypothetic homosexuality and the ‘lack of national commitment’ in his artistic 
concepts. MPs of the ruling Fidesz party refused these attacks and the cultural government let the director 
complete his official mandate. However, he was replaced at the end of his term by Attila Vidnyánszky, founding 
president of the Hungarian Theatrum Society. Vidnyánszky was also an internationally renowned director, whose 
appointment more or less followed the same process as Alföldi’s assignment (with a tender predetermined by the 
actual government). Still, Alföldi’s theatre was very successful, in terms of both critical reception and ticket 
sales, and the appointment of a new director induced a big cultural scandal. Even a few foreign theatre 
companies (e.g. the Viennese Burgtheater) made a stand for the displaced director, and domestic theatre audience 
queued up for tickets as a political demonstration. In this process, Alföldi became an iconic figure and one of the 
most important leftist public intellectuals. In this case, culture war was not initiated by the government but it still 
broke out. Critics could then refer to it as an affirmation of their claim that the government’s policy aimed at 
radical elite change. 
Besides the National Theatre, another appointment of a theatre director generated an international media reaction 
in 2011. György Dörner, an actor known for his far-right views, was appointed by Budapest mayor Tarlós as 
director of New Theatre, an otherwise rather insignificant downtown theatre in Budapest. The text of Dörner’s 
application was leaked to the internet, and gained attention for its unusually sharp anti-liberal tone: 
I would also change the name of the theatre (New Theatre) because now it creates some false 
assumptions. It implies that everything that is new is valuable at once, though this is not true. Things 
that are new just for saying that they are new, can be fake or retrograde, especially in this degenerate, 
morbid liberal hegemony. If the municipality agrees, I would change the name of the theatre to 
Hinterland Theatre. Hinterland signifies the Hungarian nation suffering under social-liberal yoke.25 
The assignment of Dörner provoked extensive protest, especially because he planned to associate with former 
politician István Csurka, who was named in the application as the future intendant of the theatre. Csurka was a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
previous social-democrat government and built up another, architecturally very controversial building at another 
site. 
25 
    http://szinhaz.hu/images/2011/hir/oktober/7/dorner_gyorgypalyazata.pdf  (The municipality did not 
agree to change the name of the theatre.) 
reputed dramatist in the communist period who, after the collapse of communism founded the far-right, anti-
semite Party of Hungarian Justice and Life.  Although by 2011 his party was virtually non-existent and Csurka 
did not play a part in Hungarian politics any more, his involvement made Dörner’s assignment an item in the 
international media, and the mayor of Budapest had to explain himself (though he declared he would not explain 
himself). The mayor argued that he favoured Dörner because the applicant focused on ‘classical Hungarian 
drama, in classical settling’, one would say, a classical traditionalist priority. Nevertheless, when the new director 
wanted to open the season with Csurka’s anti-Semitic drama (The Sixth Coffin), the mayor expressed his 
objections. Although in principle the municipality as the owner of the theatre does not have the right to influence 
artistic repertoire, the controversial play was not presented eventually. Moreover, against the plans, Csurka 
himself was unable to work in the theatre as he died in early 2012. After his death, New Theatre did not have any 
scandalous premieres. It went more mainstream in its repertoire, although presented two other (not anti-Semitic) 
plays by him. Later, New Theatre once more got into the news by giving place to a Christian theatre Festival, 
where Imre Kerényi, the deputy of symbolic affairs spoke publicly about the ‘lobby of faggots’ in theatre 
education. 
If I were the vice-king, I would take away the right of teaching actors and all the money from the 
University of Theatre and Film Arts. (…) A new road should be found, one should fight against this 
force. This is, actually, the lobby of fags…one should create performances and especially schools 
against this!26  
 Professors of the University of Theatre and Film Arts protested in open letters demanding Kerényi’s resignation. 
The Minister of Human Resources hurried to declare that Kerényi’s words were his private opinion. Apart from 
this statement, no apology was made from the government’s side. Kerényi remained in charge, though much less 
in the foreground than before. 
Traditionalist ideology can be interpreted as a tool for displacing members of the old elite. This seems to be true 
of theatre and, to some extent, the Hungarian Academy of Arts. Besides the National Theatre and New Theatre, 
many other new, politically loyal theatre directors were appointed by local governments with the help of the 
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newly established Hungarian Theatrum Society. However, most of the new appointees, once in charge, did not 
turn to anti-liberal or markedly traditionalist artistic concepts (Kristóf, 2017). 
Discussion 
My research question was whether the cultural policy making of the Orbán government was driven by the 
ideology of postcommunist traditionalism (Csillag & Szelényi, 2015). The content analysis has shown that the 
elements of the concept in several cases appeared on an official level in cultural policy as a discursive 
framework. Given the logic of cultural wars, it is not surprising, that the actions of the government selected in 
my case study as representatives of postcommunist traditionalism, have been at the same time the biggest 
cultural scandals of the studied period. Nevertheless, my findings  does not imply that the state attains a coherent 
illiberal propaganda in Hungary. The government initiated many other actions in the field of cultural policy 
without any hint of illiberal ideology.  Rather, a double structure can be observed: the representatives of anti-
liberal ideology are typically not professional party politicians but former members of the political clientele, 
recently entrusted with delegated power by the prime minister. While the ministerial structure is responsible for 
the general management of cultural issues and maintaining institutions; symbolic issues and ‘culture wars,’ along 
with the challenge of constructing a new elite, are assigned to the prime minister’s own loyal intellectuals. 
Among the elements of the anti-liberal half of this double-structured cultural strategy, many characteristics of 
Csillag and Szelényi’s post-communist traditionalism/conservatism could be found (Csillag & Szelényi, 2015). 
First and foremost, the discourse of patriotism-nationalism penetrates all the actions of this cultural strategy. 
National Library was designed for the reinforcement of nationalist authors in the literary canon. The Hungarian 
Academy of Arts claims explicitly that it expects ‘national commitment’ from its candidates. New appointees to 
theatre director posts emphasise the same. It is a crucial element, given Viktor Orbán’s views on the function of 
culture; that is creating and maintaining the political community. Secondly,  religious allusions are present. Anti-
liberal actors are speaking against liberalism in the name of Christianity, when they object to blasphemy or refer 
to the Christian cultural tradition. Nationalism is strongly linked to this narrative; according to the line of 
arguments that Hungary is a Christian country, values of Hungarian culture are products of the Christian 
tradition, and hence sacred. The concept of sanctity penetrates the cultural discourse in assertions like ‘great 
Hungarian dramas are sacred pieces’ or the claim that the National Theatre should be consecrated. Another 
noticeable element is occasional anti-gayism. Traditionally, this is the territory of far-right movements, and that 
is the case in Hungary. Unlike in Putin’s Russia, there is no state-supported anti-gay propaganda, and Budapest 
Gay Pride is organized every year, though with a far-right counter-demonstration. The far-right parliamentary 
party Jobbik targeted the sexual orientation of the director of the National Theatre several times between 2010 
and 2013, while MPs of the ruling Fidesz party refused these attacks. However, at least in one case (the ‘lobby of 
faggots’) a governmental deputy used the anti-gay rhetoric for the justification of his claims on institutional 
change. The last and even more controversial ideological element is antisemitism.  Explicitly it is missing from 
governmental rhetoric. Rather, authors of Holocaust themed pieces with international reputation, like Kertész or 
Nemes Jeles are highly honoured. Meanwhile, in implicit cultural policy, the government’s tacit definition of 
antisemitism is not inclusive: the principle seems to be that cultural achievement is separable from objectionable 
views and not anti-Semitic works of anti-Semitic authors can be included in the cultural canon in order to 
strengthen the radically nationalist tradition. 
Nevertheless, despite that in some of its actions, the Orbán government uses postcommunist traditionalist 
ideology, shifts made by the government do not constitute a coherent ideology-driven cultural policy. The results 
of the incoherent governmental actions show that the main aim of the government is not an ideological 
homogenisation of culture but the weakening of old elite structures and institutions to favour its own loyal 
cultural elite. Thus, anti-liberal rhetoric serves to provide a narrative framework for governmental moves aimed 
at eliminating old cultural structures with the goal of the redistribution of cultural positions and resources. This 
goal is implemented by (1) attempts to rewrite the cultural canon, (2) the occupation of existing elite positions in 
the cultural field, and (3) founding new cultural institutions and positions, thereby creating or strengthening 
parallel/alternative structures alongside the existing ones in the cultural field.  
Nevertheless, the presented case shows that the results of these governmental attempts were controversial as the 
government tried and backed down several times. Canon rewriting is one of the most difficult policy tasks. If a 
government is unwilling or unable to use the opportunity of censorship, as in the communist era, it might be 
easier to include new authors in the canon than to eliminate others, as it happened in the case of the ‘radical 
nationalist triad’ . The process of institution building was more successful, but the constraints here  are somewhat 
similar. If the government does not eliminate rival cultural organisations or censor oppositional cultural products, 
its opportunities are limited to increasing support to its loyal supporters, as in the cases of HAA, the Hungarian 
Theatrum Society and the NCF, and cultural diversity endures27 
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It wasalso a limitation for the Hungarian government that administratively empowered cultural organizations 
remained very loyal but did not used their delegated power to homogenise culture or to expurgate left-wing 
artists. György Fekete does not play the role of a ‘cultural commissar’ as it was feared and Imre Kerényi took a 
back seat. The new organizations, founded or strengthened as a gesture for a right-wing intellectual circle, indeed 
principally served only as payoffs for the political clientele. Nevertheless, the narratives of the political sides 
have not gotten closer to each other. What  is perceived as cultural homogenization by the left is understood by 
the new elite as a process of heterogenization or pluralization against ‘liberal hegemony’. In spite of this and 
beyond their anti-liberal attitude, members of the new cultural elite aspire most of the time for a general 
acknowledgement in the cultural field, which makes them support and reward cultural achievement regardless of 
its ideological content, as it was shown in the case study.  
Csillag and Szelényi regarded postcommunist traditionalism as a popular ideology that appeals ordinary people 
and used by the political elite to gain the sympathy of potential voters. The lesson of the second and third turn of 
the Orbán government is, that prime minister Orbán is very successful in this, indeed using traditionalist 
concepts like anti-immigration and images of common enemies of the nation in a virtuosic populist way. 
Nevertheless, in the case of cultural policy, this populist use of ideology would not really apply, because it is 
only the elite and not the majority of voters that are interested in cultural issues like the activity of Art 
Academies. Why is cultural policy making still important in the study of illiberal democracies? My case study 
showed that the relevance of cultural policy making lies in the successful  creation of  a loyal cultural elite for a 
managed illiberal political system. This resource -redistributing process required the legitimizing function of  
postcommunist traditionalist ideology, but it has not caused a deep or expansive traditionalist turn in the cultural 
field itself. The central field of force in Hungarian culture, visioned by Viktor Orbán in 2009, has been created 
since then rather in institutional and financial, than in ideological terms. 
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 Table 1 State support for the HAA 
2011 330 thousand euro 
2012 5 million euro 
2013 8,2 million euro 
2014 15, 1 million euro 
2015 17, 5 million euro 
2016 
22 million euro  
Source: Magyar Narancs28 
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   http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/megy-a-kukaba-95820 
